The aim of this paper is to look for evidence of financial contagion suffered by several countries as a result of the latest Argentine crisis. I focus my attention on a set of countries: Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela. I also focus exclusively on three financial markets: foreign exchange, stock exchange, and sovereign debt. In order to test the hypothesis of contagion, Vector Autoregression (VAR) models and instantaneous correlation coefficients corrected for heteroscedasticity are estimated. The analysis shows that there is no evdence of contagion. This result provides empirical support for the non-crisis-contingent theories of international financial contagion.
Introduction
A number of dramatic financial crises have marked the nineties: the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) currency attacks in 1992-93, the Tequila crisis in 1994-95, the East Asian crises in 1997, the Russian default in 1998, and the Brazilian devaluation in 1999. Most of these crises spread from one country to others far away on the globe and with very different economic structures. This phenomenon has led many economists to study and try to explain "contagion", i.e. why and through what channels financial crises spread.
There is no one generally accepted definition of contagion in the economic literature. Different papers adopt different definitions as an operative basis for theoretical or empirical work 1 .
Forbes and Rigobon (2001) divide theoretical explanations of contagion into two groups: crisis-contingent and non-crisis-contingent theories. The crisis-contingent theories assume that the transmission mechanisms change during a crisis, and therefore market co-movements increase after a shock.
Examples of crisis-contingent theories are based on multiple equilibria and endogenous liquidity. International investors could find it rational to suddenly withdraw their capital from a country if they fear to be otherwise left with no claim on a limited pool of foreign exchange reserves. Formal models 2 of contagion with multiple equilibria have been developed, among others, by Masson (1999) . An example of crisis-contingent theories in which the transmission mechanism is based on liquidity shocks is due to Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) . According to these authors liquidity constraints can induce agents to sell securities of emerging markets once they have incurred losses due to currency and equity depreciations in the crisis country.
The non-crisis-contingent theories assume that any large cross-market correlations after a shock are a continuation of linkages existing before the crisis. Examples of these theories base their explanations of how shocks are transmitted on "real linkages", that is economic fundamentals, such as trade and common global shocks. Glick and Rose (1999) claim that when a crisis country experiences a currency devaluation, its major trading partners and competitors are likely to suffer a speculative attack themselves. This occurs because investors foresee that a depreciation of the first victim-country will turn the trade balance of the partner countries into a deficit requiring a devaluation to balance the trade account. On the other hand, simultaneous crises across countries can occur because of a common, global shock, such as a major shift in industrial countries production or a change in commodity prices. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and Chuhan et al. (1998) relate changes in US interest rates to capital flows in Latin America.
Following Rigobon (2002, p. 2224) , in this paper contagion is defined as "a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country (or group of countries). According to this definition, if two markets show a high degree of co-movement during periods of stability, even if the markets continue to be highly correlated after a shock to one market, this may not constitute contagion. According to this paper's definition, it is only contagion if cross-market co-movement increases significantly after the shock". This definition presents two advantages. First, it provides a straightforward test to measure contagion, by measuring the cross-market correlations before and after a shock. Second, tests based on this definition can provide evidence in favour of or against each of the two groups of theories discussed above.
Correlation analysis has been widely used in the empirical literature on contagion. This approach considers a significant increase in correlation between markets as evidence of contagion. A seminal paper by King and Wadhwani (1990) uses this approach to look at changes in correlation coefficients between different markets occurring after the stock market crash in October 1987. A wide number of papers have applied this approach to study the most recent financial crises, finding evidence of large co-movements of asset returns, although it is not clear whether such co-movements increase signif-icantly after a crisis. Baig and Goldfajn (1999) find a significant increase in cross-country correlations among currencies and sovereign spreads of five East Asian countries during the 1997-98 turmoil if compared to other tranquil periods. Bazdresch and Werner (2001) apply the correlation analysis, along with other econometric techniques, to quantify the contagion suffered by Mexico in the financial crises of the period 1997-1999. However, a significant increase in correlations among different countries' markets may not be sufficient evidence of contagion. In fact, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show that, owing to an increase in volatility of economic variables over crisis periods, higher correlations could simply be due to heteroscedasticity, and therefore be the result of historical high correlation between markets. 
Empirical methodology
The empirical analysis is carried out without the assumption of a specific theoretical model explaining the causes and mechanism of contagion. I analyse the relationship between the main financial markets of different countries by using two econometric methodologies. First, a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model is estimated for each of the financial markets to obtain an insight in the causal relationships between the same variables for different countries.
According to Bazdresch and Werner (2001, p. 303 ) "VARs provide for lagged responses between variables, measuring the span of time that shocks take to disappear and providing a first approximation to address issues of causation". Second, instantaneous correlation coefficients, which constitute an intuitive measure of co-movements, are estimated and then tested using the two sample heteroscedastic t-test developed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) .
The financial markets analysed, commonly considered as the main vehicles of contagion, are the foreign exchange, the stock exchange, and the sovereign debt market.
Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela are considered because they are Argentina's main neighbours. I also consider Russia and Mexico because re-cently (1994 and 1998) they have been affected by financial crises and contagion. Finally, Turkey is included because it is experiencing a serious financial crisis at the same time as Argentina.
The Appendix contains a detailed discussion of the variables and the sources of data.
VAR model
In this paper, a VAR model is estimated for each financial market using Tables 1,2 and 3 about here] Formally, the VAR system in a standard or reduced form is given by:
where y t is an (n × 1) vector of variables, c is an (n × 1) vector of constants, Φ j is an (n × n) matrix of autoregressive coefficients for j = 1, 2, ..., p, and ε t is a multivariate white noise process, i.e.,
with Ω an (n × n) symmetric positive definite matrix.
In the three VAR models estimated, the vector y t includes the following variables.
• For the exchange rates y t = {ARGpeso t , BRAreal t , MEXpeso t , RUSrouble t , TURlira t , URUpeso t , VENbolivar t } 0
• For the stock market indexes y t = {ARGgener t , BRAbovespa t , MEXipc t , RUSrts t , VENgener t } 0 . Due to the insignificant level of capitalization of the Uruguayan and the Turkish stock market, these two countries are excluded from the model.
• For the sovereign debt spreads y t = {ARG t , BRA t , MEX t , RUS t , TUR t , VEN t } 0 . Data on the Uruguayan sovereign spreads are not available. 
Correlation coefficients
The second technique is based on instantaneous correlation coefficients, which give an intuitive measure of the degree of co-movement between economic variables. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show that an increase in the variance of a financial variable over a crisis period biases the estimation of the correlation coefficients in favour of the conclusion that the correlation between variables is significantly higher in turmoil periods than in tranquil periods, and thus contagion exists. In order to eliminate this bias they propose to correct the standard correlation coefficient by using the formula:
where ρ u is the unadjusted (i.e., conditional on heteroscedasticity) correlation coefficient, δ is the relative increase in the variance of the crisis country's variable from the tranquil to the turmoil period, and ρ is the adjusted correlation coefficient. Once corrected in this fashion, the significance of the increase of the correlation coefficient during the crisis period as compared
to the tranquil period is tested using a one-tail t-test, assuming a t-student asymptotic distribution. The hypotheses are:
where ρ c represents the adjusted correlation coefficient for the crisis period, 
Empirical results
In this Section, I use VAR models and correlation coefficients corrected for heteroscedasticity to analyse the contagion effects of the Argentine financial crisis. Based on the results of the unit root tests in Subsection 2.1, the correlation analysis considers log-differences of the variables of interest to avoid spurious regression issues. As for the VAR analysis, when the time series are nonstationary, as in this case, the VAR model can be specified in pure differences, in levels, or it can be specified as a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) to allow for the existence of cointegration. Following the line of argument of Ramaswamy and Slok (1998), I do not use a VECM since this paper is not focused on the long run relationship among the variables.
To make the VAR analysis consistent with the correlation one, variables in log-differences instead of log-levels are used. Appendix reports the results obtained in the correlation analysis by using variables in log-levels rather than in log-differences.
VAR analysis
Generalized impulse response functions and generalized forecast error variance decompositions provide adequate tools to assess the impact of one shock on an Argentine financial market on the other countries 4 . The duration of this effect is also highlighted. Table 4 shows to what extent the forecast error variance of the Argentine exchange rate can explain the variance of other countries' exchange rates.
Foreign exchange markets
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The contemporary effect is negligible for all markets, and it remains such for Brazil and Mexico up to 15 days. The effect is somewhat bigger for Turkey (1.78% after 10 days), Uruguay (2.2% after 10 days), and Venezuela (1.86% after 10 days). Russia's currency seems to be much more affected by a shock to the Argentine's Peso: 8.79 % after 5 days and 8.97% after 15 days.
As for the immediate impact, Figure 1 shows that a shock on the Argentine currency has no significant effect on any other currencies.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In the next period, it affects the Russian Rouble, the Turkish Lira, the Uruguayan Peso, and the Venezuelan Bolivar, but these effects die out after just six days or so. Table 5 reports the percentage effect of the Argentina's stock index variance on the forecast error variance of the other countries' stock indexes.
Stock markets
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The effect on Brazil is almost null while it is very small on Mexico (1.74% after 5 days), Russia (1.66% after 5 days and up to 15 days), and Venezuela (1.66% after 5 days and up to 15 days).
The impulse response function shown in Figure 2 reveals a similar scenario: a one standard deviation innovation in Argentina's stock index does 13 not produce any statistically significant effect on Russia, Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
To sum up, stock markets in the countries under analysis show an insignificant reaction to the crisis in Argentina.
Sovereign debt markets
Sovereign debt spreads seem slightly more reactive to the Argentine crisis, though there is still no statistically significant effect. Only the forecast error variance of Brazil and Venezuela is determined by more than 3% by the Argentine spreads from 0 to 15 days ahead forecast.
[Insert Table 6 about here] Figure 3 shows that, though in the right direction, a one standard deviation innovation in Argentine spreads has a small and short lasting effect on the other countries' spreads.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Correlation analysis
Correlation analysis gives a straightforward measure of variables' co-movement.
In order to have a complete picture of the timing of the crisis in Argentina and of its potential effects on other countries, I analyse four time-intervals.
These four time-intervals all start when the crisis begins: the first two weeks, the first two months, the first four months and the all-crisis interval until the end of the sample (November 29th, 2002). I expect to find evidence of an increasing correlation between markets immediately after the crisis began, and a diminishing correlation in later weeks.
Foreign exchange markets
Looking at table 7, it is clear that exchange rate correlations do not exhibit any degree of contagion.
[Insert 
Stock markets
Stock market correlations, shown in Table 8 , exhibit a sharp decrease in the correlation coefficients for Brazil, Mexico, Russia, and Venezuela in all periods: they drop close to zero immediately after the crisis begins, and remain at this level up to the end of the sample period.
[Insert Table 8 about here] Therefore, no stock markets in the set of countries analysed seem to have suffered contagion from Argentina. The correlation between the Turkish and the Uruguayan stock markets and the Argentine one is not available due to the scarce capitalization of the first two, hence the blank columns in Table   8 .
Sovereign debt markets
In the sovereign debt markets, as well as in the stock markets, the correlation coefficients decrease sharply. The sovereign debt market does not show any evidence of contagion.
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[Insert Table 9 about here]
Conclusion
This paper tests the hypothesis of contagion for the latest Argentine financial The evidence provided in this paper can be seen as supportive of the group of non-crisis-contingent theories, that is, of the theories which tend to base explanations of contagion on "real linkages" among countries. Tables 10, 11 , and 12 report the results of the correlation analysis on the log-levels rather than the log-differenced variables. As shown in Subsection 2.1, all the time series in log-levels are I(1). This supports the procedure of using log-differences as a way of avoiding the issue of spurious regression.
Alternative tests on level variables
Nevertheless, looking at the variables in log-levels is interesting as it shows that the correlation analysis is not robust to the way we transform variables.
In fact, though contagion seems to be absent in the estimation of the correlation coefficients of the exchange rates, Table 11 5 shows that the stock exchange market exhibits a significant degree of contagion from Argentina to Mexico in the first two weeks of the crisis period, and to Russia in the first two months. No significant effect can be observed, however, on the other countries' stock indexes.
[Insert Tables 10 and 11 about here] As for the sovereign spreads, the analysis of the coefficients reported in Table 12 makes clear that for Mexico, Turkey, and Venezuela it is legitimate to talk about contagion. Correlation coefficients for these three countries, in fact, increase in a significant way over the whole crisis period. Contagion emerges also in the first two months for Venezuela.
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[Insert Table 12 about here] 
